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RESUMEN: En est" articulo cxtenccmos ct modcto de sucesico
familiar de Patia, Ravid V Wilng 12001l1, Y arqumentamos que los
g(rente~ ramlneres pueden SCi exuosos si nenos tacrores se
presenten. como un conocwnento tacuo, bcnenclos no mont-
tarios a! dirigir la ernpresa, y ('I desarrollo de ccnas habilidades
!)crenciales personales. Uulizamos (I csso rie Carvajal, un irn-
pouame grupo ecooonnco colombiano, para scporta- nvesnas
ideas v mostrar que, conuarto J 1<1evstencc empiric a inrcma-
cional. existcn cenas ct-coestaoclas Oil in las cuates los esfuer-
70S que haren Ius nereucros en la gerencia puedcn set similare
a lOS del fundadcr y mavcccs a los de los qerentes externos.
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lE ROLE DES HERITIERS DANS lES ENTfiEPRISES
FAMllIAlE:S: u CAS DE CARVAJAL
RESUME: Ccr article cons.oerc lc mooete de succession term-
hate de Paha, Ravid y Wang (2008), et l'arqument consrste en re
que res geraills familiau~ peuvent arriver au succes si cerra ins
taeteurs se presentcnt, tels que la ronnaissance tarite, les be-
nefices non monelaires dans 18 direction lie I'entreprise, el Ie
developpeillent de certaint's habileles de geslions personnelles,
lr cas de Carvajal eSlutilise, un important groupe econOllliqut'
colombien, pour developper nOs id&es et montrer que, contrai-
rement ~ I'&vidence empiriqu(' Inlernationale, il ('J<"ISlecertaines
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apresenlam-se, como um eonl1erimenlO t<kito, beneJicios nao
monetarios ao diriglr a cmpresll, e 0 destnvolvimento de cenas
habili(ladcs gerenciais pessoai>. Utili/anlOS ° caso de Carvajal,
um illlportanle grupo econ6mico colombiano, para suportar
nossas idt'ias e mostrar que, dO eontnirio da evidi'.ncia empirl-
ca inrcrnarional, exislem renas rirrunsli'incias sob as quais us
esfon;os que fazem flS herdeirns na dirc\;'lO podelll ser ~imilares
aos do fundador c rnaiort~s aos dos t:Iirigcntes eXlernos.
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ABSTRACT: We extend the POllia,Ravid and Wang (2008) model of family succession, and argue
that family CEOscan be successful if certain characteristics, such as private knowledge, non mon-
etary benefits from managing the firm, and personal skills are mel. We use Carvajal, a large Co-
lombian business group, to support our Ideas and show that, contrary to international empirical
evidence, there are certain circumstances where efforts made by heirs can be similar to those of the
founder and exceed those of outside managers.
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INTRODUCTION
Carvajal, a business group property of the Carvajal family in Colombia
with more than 100 years of history in the publishing business-, has sur-
vived various succession processes. Given the strong empirical evidence of
failures of family firms managed by heirs, we raised the question: How is
Carvajal different? We develop a theoretical model that shows that, under
certain conditions, heirs working as managers in family businesses can ex-
hibit behavior similar to the founders' and superior to that of outside mana-
gers. This is interesting not only in the Carvajal case, but also in the case of
any family firm approaching succession.
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov and Lang
(2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), among others, show that the majority of
firms in the world are family-controlled. Family business literature has fo-
cused on problems related to ownership, management and control, finan-
cial performance, and succession. Research in the latter shows that founder
transition plays a critical role In determining the company's future (see for
example Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003). The "succession problem"
has generated an interesting debate in relation to who should occupy the





On the one hand, arguments in favor of founder or heir
management assert that they enhance a firm's long term
focus (Bertrand and Schaar, 2006); allow the use of speci-
fic knowledge about the company that is difficult for outsi-
ders to obtain (Bertrand and Schaar, 2006); and, generate
high levels of confidence for key stakeholders. There is also
a negative relationship among family firms managed by
the founder or heirs and the firms' cost of debt (Anderson
and Reeb, 2003; Anderson, Sattar and Reeb, 2003). Mo-
reover, having a manager who is the founder or a member
of the founder's family can benefit families in non-mone-
tary ways (amenity potential) (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).
Finally, family management better protects family's inter-
ests (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003).
On the other hand, arguments against management by the
founder or members of the founder's family maintain that
the manager is selected from a restricted group of indi-
viduals and it is possible that he or she does not possess
the management abilities to direct the company-due to
not having been educated to an appropriate level for the
position and not having the necessary management skills
and experience (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006). In addition, con-
flicts of interest among family members can undermine the
organization's longevity and impede succession processes
(Colli and Rose, 2003). Finally, benefits perceived for supe-
rior financial performance are blurred when the company
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is owned and managed by one family with multiple mem-
bers, due to the complex nature of good corporate gover-
nance issues facing the business (Miller et al., 2007).
To weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of a mana-
ger who is the founder or a member of the founder's family
versus an outside manager, empirical studies have shown
a negative relationship between firms' productivity or per-
formance and family ownership, due to the appointment of
family members as company managers (Barth, Gulbrand-
sen and Schonea, 2005; Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008). Con-
tradicting these results, Maury (2006) shows that active
control by family owners is associated with high profitabili-
ty, and Lee (2006) finds that family firms tend to experien-
ce higher employment and revenue growth over time and
are more profitable. Similar results are provided by Allo-
uche et al. (2008) and Martinez et al. (2007). Likewise,
Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that financial performan-
ce is superior in family businesses as opposed to non-fa-
mily companies. Their analysi« suggests that companies
with the presence of the family founder show better finan-
cial and accounting performance than non-family firms. In
addition, their research also shows the performance diffe-
rential based on the origin of management in family bu-
sinesses Specifically, managers who are members of the
family (founders or their heirs) show a positive relations-
hip with financial profits. However, market performance
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appears to be better only in cases where there is the pre-
sence of a founding or outside manager. Heirs do not have
this effect on the firm's market performance. Villalonga
and Amit (2006) state that family ownership creates value
only when the founder ISthe CEO or there is an outsider as
CEO with the founder as chairman of the board. However,
in the case of heir -CEOs a firm's value depreciates. Miller
et a! (2007) comes to similar conclusions.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argue that in young firms
the founders play an important enterprising role, while In
older firms their descendants frustrate maximization of va-
lue and are too entrenched' to be removed. Morck, Stran-
geland and Yeung (2000) show that when heirs' wealth is
representative with respect to the country's GDP, they are
entrenched and the performance of companies tends to
be poor. Bennedsen et al. (2007) found that family suc-
cessions have negative effects on company performance
and the poor performance IS particularly representative
in rapidly growing industries, with a highly-trained work
force and with relatively large firms. Likewise, Cucculelli
and Micucci (2008) compare family-managed firms with
outsider-managed firms and found a negative impact on a
firm's performance and value when heirs are In control of
firms In highly competitive industries. Moreover, according
to Blanco-Mazagatos et al. (2007), during the first gene-
ration, lower agency costs balance the negative effect of
scarce financial sources. After descendants Join the firm,
the increasinq agency costs are compensated by more fi-
nancing possibilities.
In summary, existing literature shows inferior firm per-
formance and value when heirs are in top management
positions. However, there is little in family firm literature
that formally explores situations under which, given cer-
tain personal characteristics and conditions in the environ-
ment, heirs can achieve performance equal to that of the
founding manager, and superior to that of outside mana-
gement.
In th.s article, we develop a theoretical model building on
the work of Palla, Ravid and Wang (2008), assuming that
the founder's performance as manager is a function of hs
private knowledge about the firm's operations; learned ma-
nagement abilities; intangible, non-monetary benefit gai-
ned from directing and perpetuating his positions of power
in control of the company; and his effort. In our model,
Some authors, such as Shleifer and Vishny (1989), show that man-
agers seek to perpetuate their positions and therefore take actions
that make it difficult to remove them from their positions, such as
investing in specific assets that favor their permanence in the com-
pany. When this occurs, it is called "entrenchment" of the individu-
als in positions of power.
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heirs who are managers can achieve superior performance
to outside managers. Besides, we use it to analyze the spe-
cific case of one of the bigger firms in Colombia-Carvajal.
This company has had seven managers, all of them family
members', and contrary to the literature's predictions, suc-
cession processes have been successful and have allowed
the company to consolidate its position in Colombia and
rapidly extend to international markets. The model and the
detailed analysis of Carvajal highlight factors that influen-
ce the success of within-the-family succession processes,
such as training of heirs through occupying Jobs inside the
company and the presence of high intangible, non-mone-
tary benefits which may be gained from directing the firm.
This article contributes to literature of succession processes
In family firms, pointing out that heirs can obtain better re-
sults than outside managers, as long as they have learned
management abilities and obtain private knowledge inside
the family business. The intangible, non-monetary benefit
of directing the company on behalf of the family generates
a high level of private benefits which are not necessarily
detrimental to non-family shareholders.
The article is structured as follows. The second section
(The model) presents a theoretical model adapted from
Palia, Ravid and Wang (2008). The third section (Analysis
of the Carvajal case) analyzes predictions of the model in
the context of the Carvajal case. The fourth section con-
cludes.
THE MODEL
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that managers, seeking
to perpetuate their positions, Invest in specific assets that
are not value-enhancing for the company as a whole, but
that allow them to tie their Jobs to the specificity of the as-
sets in which they invest. On the other hand, Palia, Ravid
and Wang (2008) develop a model in which the founder
works with greater dedication than an outside manager,
and as a result he ISendogenously entrenched" Their mo-
del attempts to reconcile the Idea that the founders are
committed workers, and that is why they become entren-
ched and are difficult to discharge. Therefore, within their
In 2008, and after 104 years of history in the business, Carvajal
appointed, for the first time, an outsider as CEO- Ricardo Obregon.
The impact of this decision is hard to analyze just yet given the
proximity of the event. However, it will be an interesting issue to
address in the future.
Because the founder exerts a high level of effort, there is a greater
possibility of displaying better performance than with any other
manager. This, accompanied by the specific knowledge that the
founder possesses regarding the company's purpose. generates an
indirect entrenchment, that is, an endogenous entrenchment.
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assumptions they do not consider that the founder achie-
ves entrenchment by specific investments that are not op-
timal for the company but that allow him to maintain his
position of power. On the contrary, it supposesthat entren-
chment occurs becausethe founder tends to dedicate him-
self completely to the company's success(palia, Ravid and
Wang, 2008, p. 57). These authors refer to this entrench-
ment as "benevolent entrenchment".
The founder in the theoretical model
Like Palia, Ravid and Wang (2008), we formally assume
that the founder, F; makes an investment, IF' in the firm's
creation. The firm's value under the founder depends on
the profit per unit of management production, 8(1F)' the
function of management production of the founder, all,
the cost per Invested unit, (p), and the units invested by
him, (IF) It is important to clarify that all, as a function
of production, determines the level of productivity that the
firm achieves under the founder's direction. The firm's va-
lue with a founding manager is expressed in equation (1)
below:
Profit per unit of management production, 8(1), IS a
function of the units invested (I). We suppose that 8'(1) ~
0, because of which a higher unit of investment generates
a higher profit per unit of management production. Besi-
des, 8"(1) < a This implies that there is a decrease in mar-
ginal profit with respect to the level of investment
Building on the work of Palla, Ravid and Wang (2008)
and making an extension, here we assume that aO is a
function of private knowledge regarding the firm's opera-
tions (k), learned management abilities (s), an intangible,
non-monetary benefit (F) from directing and perpetuating
his positions of power in control of the company, and the
effort made by management (e) According to Burkart, Pa-
nunzi and Shleifer (2003), the intangible benefit refers to
private, non-monetary benefits of control, representing a
return for the founder that is not obtained at the expense
of company profits.'
"A founder can obtain the pleasure of having his son directing the
company that carries the family name. Alternatively, in some in-
dustries, such as sports or communication media, families can par-
ticipate in or influence social, political and cultural events through
ownership of the companies. This reason for family control sug-
gests that there is a distribution of patterns of ownership inside
the country, with companies generating considerable intangible,
non-monetary benefits for the families that control them." (Burkart,
Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003, p. 2168).
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Given that «() represents a function of management pro-
duction it holds that





which implies that greater private knowledge, greater ma-
nagement abilities, greater intangible or non-monetary
benefit, or greater effort generate greater production. In
addition,






which implies that regarding these variables there is de-
creasing marginal productivity
The outside manager,A, denotes the following better ma-
nagement alternative that the market could offer. This ma-
nager can decide about the additional investment, lA' at
a cost of pI". The firm's value with an outside manager is
VA = aJ)S(/F +lJ- p(lF +lA) (2)
in which (, ~ a and a)-) representthe function of manage-
ment production by the outside manager. It assumesthat
a,O is the function of the learned management abilities
(5). However, in general aI) does not depend on the va-
riable of private knowledge, which can only be acquired
by the founder or his heirs.' that is, k, = O. Each company
has a particular way of operating and in innovative com-
panies or sectors with accelerated technological change,
the knowledge obtained from working in the company
takes on greater importance. On the other hand, a ,0 also
depends on the intangible, non-monetary benefit, which
in this case is always assumed to be less than when the
When we refer to an outside manager, we make reference to an ex-
ecutive who does not belong to the family. If this kind of executive
has not worked in the company previously, aI) does not depend
on the variable of private knowledge. For example, experience ac-
quired from working in the company from the beginning of one's
working life, specific knowledge derived from using the technolo-
gies developed by the organization, understanding of the culture
and organizational climate, among others. However, on some oc-
casions, an outside manager may have worked previously in the
company, and may manage to acquire part or all of the private
knowledge that an heir may be able to acquire.
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founder manages the firm. That is, 1',> 1'." due to the exis-
tence of non-transferable benefits that the family foun-
der obtains when the responsibility is assumed by a family
member, such as those mentioned previously in Burkart,
Panunzi and Shleifer (2003). The advantage of the founder
operating investment is captured in «(), the ability to ma-
nage the firm. It is assumed that a,O > a)-), because k,.O
": k.,O ": 0 and 1',.> I'A'
Management compensation, as in Shleifer and Vishny
(1989) and Palla, Ravid and Wang (2008) is a function
of value added by management, that is, profit under the
founder compared with profit under a new outside mana-
ger. If the founder does not add value he is replaced by an
outside manager. Thus, w" the founding manager's salary,
is defined as:
wF =i(a,S(JF)-{aAs(JF+/,,)-pI,}) (3)
The Palia, Ravid and Wang (2008)'s model assumes that
investment has been made in period 1, at the time when
the company started and management action ISonly con-
sidered in period 2, the period in which the company ISin
operation. plF is taken as a hidden cost. In addition, it is
assumed that the expression in brackets ISfixed when the
choice of effort is made. The choice of effort in period 2
determines the result of the firm's production, because of
which aO IS a function of production with effort as an
input. Given that 80 has already been determined in pe-
riod 2, it can be seen as a constant that multiplies the ma-
nagement production level. In addition, according to the
approach of Holmstrom (1999), It is assumed that effort
generates reduced profitability for the manager. Therefore,
in period 2, the founder maximizes the following equation:
U F = wF + e{a,Os(J F)- pl ; - w,-}+ h(r, (4)
The first two terms are his salary and gains made from
holding shares (in which e represents shareholder parti-
cipation in the company), the third term represents the
function of well-being h(·) that he experiences due to the
intangible, non-monetary benefit, which is not contempla-
ted in the original model, and the fourth term represents
the cost of effort. The advantage of the founder operating
the Investment is expressed as:
oaFOI > oaJ)1
8e 1.'* 8e et-
Therefore, the founder can reach a higher level of pro-
duction for each increase of effort at any point. That is,
because his productivity is greater, an increase in the le-
vel of effort generates greater impact on production. The
problem of maximization of (4) with respect to e IS resol-
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ved by adding reasonable assumptions for the function
gO (Holmstrom, 1999). These assumptions are: g'(e) ": 0,
because of which greater management effort results in a
increasing reduction of profit for the founding or outside
manager, and g"(e) > 0, which determines that higher
levels of effort become more costly at a growing rate. In
addition, a'(e) ":° and a"(e) < O.These characterizations
provide an optimum for maximization of the founder's
profit.
Consistent with Palia, Ravid and Wang (2008) we adopt
the following notation
(a,.s(J,)- {a A s(J F + 1,,)- pl,,}) = JT(a,.(e)) (6)
in which 7[(a,_ (e)) represents relative profitability under
the founder which, given that the investment is a hidden
cost, and for a specific outside manager, is only a function
of effort, that is, the other variables remain constant. This
transforms equation (3) into:
IV, ~ f(a,S(i,)- (a,S(/,. + 1,)- pi,}) ~ fHa,(e ))) (3')
Maximizing equation (4) yields:
au, ~ a ["'F+O(a,()S(i,)-pIF-IV,}+h(J;.)-g(e)] (7)
8e ae
A detailed proof of equation (7) ISfound in the appendix.
The manager balances the marginal contribution of effort
with its marginal cost. For Palia, Ravid and Wang (2008),
the term (/'(JT(-)XI-8)+8) is essentially the manager's
sensitivity to payment for performance, that is, the chan-
ge in salaries in relation to the change in the firm's value,
plus the change in wealth to the extent that it changes the
firm's value. If the manager's sensitivity to pay for perfor-
mance (j'(JT(-)XI- 8)+ 8) is noted as r: It is possible to
rewrite equation (7) as follows:
((oaA·)joe)S Xi' H)XI - e)+ e) = g' (e) (8)
(5)
Proposition I
For given levels of effort, (that is, the same gee)) and for a
given sensitivity to pay for performance, the founders (as
characterized by equation (3)), will exercise a higher level
of effort than outside managers.
Proof See appendix.
The intuition is as follows: suppose that an outside mana-
ger optimizes to a level (,. For this level, given the con-
ditions in proposition 1 for the founder, the left part of
equation (8) is greater than the right part of the same
equation, since marginal income is still greater than the
marginal cost of effort for the founder. Given the assump-
tions for «() and gee), the founder will increase his effort
until reaching its optimum, therefore the founder works
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more efficiently and thus generates more effort for a given
set of incentives.
Proposition 1 suggests that the founders are less averse to
effort. However, it is better to center the attention on what
the founders are doing. They have greater clarity about in-
novation and the company because of having conceived
it. They possess private knowledge about the firm's actIvi-
ties and, consistent with their personal characteristics, can
pursue the maximization of the company's value with grea-
ter dedication. This proposition generates the "benevolent
entrenchment" concept of Palia, Ravid and Wang (2008)
we mentioned before. This is, that the founder works with
greater dedication and therefore, does not respond to or
need additional incentives.
Proposition 1 is essentially the same as Lemma 1 In Pa-
lia, Ravid and Wang (2008) However, we are assuming
that the founder's management production function, , is
also a function of his private knowledge about the firm's
operations; learned management abilities, intangible, non-
monetary benefit gained from directing and perpetuating
his positions of power in control of the company; and his
effort. This specification allows us to maintain that the
founder's management production function is always abo-
ve the management production function of the best outsi-
de manager, that is: aFO > all
The heir in the theoretical model
The advantage of the herr operating investment is equa-
lly captured in aO, the ability to manage the firm. It is
assumed that a,O ::':aj-J > aAo. where H denotes the
management alternative that the family can offer through
the founder's heirs. As in the case of the founder, it IS assu-
med that all) IS a function of the herr's private knowledge
about the way the firm operates, (k,) acquired by working
inside the family business; learned management abilities
(S,,), intangible, non-monetary benefits (r,) from directing
and perpetuating positions of power for the family by con-
trolling the business and the effort made by the heir as
manager of the firm (e,,).
The heir as manager, I-I, can make an additional inves-
tment I", at a cost of pi". The firm's value with an heir as
manager, is expressed in equation (9)
V" = a" (-)S(iF + I,,)~ P(iF + I,,) (9)
in which I,,::': 0 and aJ) represent the function of the ma-
naging heir's management production. His compensation
is equally a function of value added by the manager, that
is, profit under the heir compared to profit under an out-
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side manager. Thus, wI!' the managing heir's salary, is de-
fined as:
w" =1(a"B(/,+I")-pl,, -{a"B(i,-+/J-pf,,}) (10)
Again, plr is taken as a hidden cost. In period 2, the heir
maximizes the followinq equation:
u" = "'" +B{a" 08(1,- + 1,,)- p(l,_ + 1,,)- "'''}+ h(',,)- gee) (11)
The first two terms are salary and earnings due to sha-
re ownership (in which e represents shareholder parti-
cipation in the company). The third term represents the
function of well-being hO experienced from the intangible,
non-monetary benefit and the fourth term represents the
cost of effort. The heir's advantage relative to the outside
manager is expressed as:
aaF(-)1 ::':aa,J)1 > aaJ)1 (12)
Be e* Be e* Be t'.
Therefore, an heir can reach a production level equal to
that of the founder and always greater than the manager's
for every effort level. Note that what allows greater pro-
ductivity of heirs is their private knowledge about the firm
operations (k) and the intangible, non-monetary benefits
(r) he can extract by managing the firm. In this model it is
assumed that the heirs have learned management abilities
(s) that are at least as good as those of the potential out-
side manager. In other words outside managers may have
more formal training, but heirs has more management
abilities developed through more intense in-job learning
within the company. It is necessary, then, to consider the
problem of maximization of (11) with respect to e. Again,
for simplifying the model we adopt the following notation:
(a"s(l F + ',,)- pi" - {a,s(l ,- + I,}- pi,,)) = ;r(a" (e)) (13)
in which ;r(a" (e)) represents relative profit under the heir,
which, given that the investment is a hidden cost and for a
specific outside manager, is only a function of effort. This
transforms equation (10) Into
"'" = /[a"B(J,. + 1,,)- pi" -{a"B(/,_ + IJ- plJ] = /(ff(a" (e))) (10')
A detailed proof of equation (14) is found in the appendix.
As in the case of the founder, the term (/'(JTOXt -0)+0)
is taken as the manager's sensitivity to pay for performan-
ce, and if this is noted as ~ equation (14) can be rewritten
as follows ((8auC)/8e)B)Y = g'(e).
Therefore, it holds that:
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Proposition 2
For given levels of effort, (that 15, the same gee») and for a
given sensitivity to pay for performance, heirs (as enoree-
terized by equation (10)) will exert a higher level of effort
than outside managers.
rrooi See appendix.
Following the same Intuition as before, given that the mar-
qinal cost for the heir is lower than the manager's, his level
of effort will be greater, at Its optimum, than that exerted
by the outside manager, achieving In consequence greater
productivity for the firm.
Thus, the model concludes that the founder and heirs work
with greater dedication and exert greater effort and the-
refore endogenously generate benevolent entrenchment
Note that what allows the effort to be greater in the case
of the heirs IS private knowledge regarding the firm's ope-
ration (1<) and a greater intangible, non-monetary benefit
(r), compared to the outside manager. In this way, the mo-
del predicts that a founder always achieves performance
superior to that of an outside manager who is the market's
best alternative. In addition, heirs as managers in family
businesses can perform as effectively as the founder and
better than an outside manager, as long as they have
acquired specific knowledge by occupying positions within
the company before being named managers, and receive
high intangible, non-rnonetary benefits from being the ma-
nager of the family business.
The following section addresses the Carvajal case not to
empirically validate the model, which of course is impossi-
ble with just one observation, but to highlight some of the
model's main theoretical arguments.
ANALYSIS OF THE CARVAJAL CASE
Academic literature and media in the family business has
focused on the problems affecting management succes-
sian. For example, in 2003, Dinero magazine surnmari-
zed the crisis facing Danaranjo" after the death of David
Danaranjo is a recognized company in the printing and graphic arts
sector in Colombia. The company set up in 1943 in Bogota. In 1960
it opened branches in Medellin and 8arranquilla. In 1964 it im-
ported machinery for making notebooks. in the same year it began
making office stationery supplies. In 1970 it created its continuous
forms division, a product that is to this day only offered by Carva-
jal. In the same decade Danaranjo entered another business that it
now dominates: printing of securities instruments. In the eighties,
the company participated in the telephone directory market with
the printing of the Pereira directory, a product introduced in 1958
in Colombia by Carvajal. Currently its head office is in Bogota, with
branches in Medellin, Barranquilla, Cali, Pereira, Bucaramanga, Cu-
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Naranjo, who founded the company in 1943 and died in
1993. This company did not succeed in carrying out a
planned succession. The heirs making decisions had not
previously worked In management positions within the
company and conflicts of interest among family rnern-
bers led to the company seeking bankruptcy protection in
1999. As Dinero reported, the Danaranjo case confirms the
theoretical predictions regarding the problems that arise
around succession processes in family businesses (Dinero,
2003, p. 43). It is necessary, however, to take into account
which factors make the difference in the story of family
firms, like Carvajal, that manage to implement successful
succession processes.
It IS important to clarify why we consider Carvajal to be
"successful". Carvajal in 1904 was just a small pnnting
shop and now it is recognize as one of the strongest bu-
siness groups In Colombia with more than 30 firms in its
portfolio; it pioneer the international focus in the prin-
ting business, operate business in more than 18 countries
around the world (Dinero, 2008), and all of these after
seven within-family successions Therefore the word "sue-
cess" goes beyond the traditional accounting and financial
measures.
We now continue with a brief historical account of the Car-
vajal group in order to highlight some of the key factors we
think have contributed to the Carvajal "success" These fac-
tors although we recognize there could many others (e.q.
political connections and rent seeking behavior), emerge
directly from our theoretical.
A brief history of Carvajal'
Manuel Carvajal Valencia was born in 1851 in Popayan
He went to high school and university and later partici-
paed actively in the revolutionary forces of the Conser-
vative party in 1877 in Cali. He married Micaela Borrero
in 1881 with whom he had six children: Alberto In 1882,
Hernando in 1884, Manuel Antonio in 1886, Ana Maria
in 1888, Mario in 1896 and Josefina in 1898. In 1894,
Manuel Carvajal Valencia joined up with some friends to
acquire an old prmting press that they installed in Palmira
in 1869. His motivations were more political than com-
mercial; he founded the weekly newspaper La Opinion for
defending the ideas and candidates of his political party.
Manuel Carvajal interrupted his business activities during
the War of a Thousand Days (1899·1901), leaving his el-
dest sons, Alberto and Hernando Carvajal Borrero in char-
cuta, Neive. lbaque. Tunja. Rioacha, and Barrancabermeja. In addi-
tion, it is run by an outside manager. Source: Danaranjo SA (2008).
Information in this section is taken from Vanegas (2003).
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ge of the family. Because of these responsibilities, the two
eldest boys had to leave school. On October 29, 1904, the
Carvajal family business was launched in the form of a firm
called Imprenta Comercia! (Commercial Printing). La Opi-
nion had ceased publication, but the family, true to its vo-
cation, began to publish the H Dia newspaper. In 1907,
Imprenta Comereial was performing well financially so Ma-
nuel Carvajal decided to create Carvajal and Co.
In 1910 Manuel Carvajal had begun to delegate the ma-
nagement of the company to Hernando Carvajal Borrero,
the second of his sons, who had shown business skills while
working in the company. In 1911 Carvajal and Cia. impor-
ted the first paper shredding machine in western Colombia
and diversified into commerce. After the death of Manuel
Carvajal Valencia, the presidency was held by the second
of his sons, Hernando Carvajal Borrero, with the help of his
older brother Alberto, from 1912 to 1939. During this pe-
riod, because of the First World War, Carvajal had to deal
with limited Imports and had to produce and sell articles
that the company had imported. The company expanded
its operations to Buga and Palmira where it sold the excess
products it could not sell in Cali. In 1921, Hernando Carva-
jal decided to travel to Europe and after several months of
searching purchased the company's first lithographic prin-
ting press, which was installed by German technicians
During the 1930s Carvajal continued to import machinery,
but in 1939 With the outbreak of World War II and the im-
possibility of importing machinery and parts, the company
set up its first mechanical department for the construction
of replacement parts. The same year, Hernando Carvajal
Borrero suffered a cerebral hemorrhage, so his eldest son
Manuel Carvajal Sinisterra took over the company's pre-
sidency under the supervrsion of his uncle Mano Carvajal
Borrero. At this time the company had four distinct bu-
sinesses: printinq, lithography, manufacture of stationery
and a retail warehouse. In addition, operations began to
extend to the whole country. Manuel Carvajal Sinisterra
is the most important and memorialized of the presidents
of Carvajal and one of the most significant figures of the
Valle del Cauca region of Colombia. His first years of for-
mal study were in Cali, but at the insistence of his uncle
Alberto Carvajal he went to Belgium to continue his se-
condary school studies. However, because of the financial
crash of 1929 he had to return to Colombia, suspend his
studies and begin work for Carvajal as an employee. It is
important to point out that Manuel Carvajal did not have
university education He became manager of the company
at the age of 23.
The presidency of Manuel Carvajal Sinisterra, from 1939
to 1971, was characterized by the company's growth and
diversification. The company benefited from State protec-
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tionism, becoming a truly national company with presence
in the most important departments in Colombia and ma-
king the first inroads into other countries. One of the many
outstanding projects of this period was the printing of the
telephone directory for the city of Bogota in 1958, which
saw the inception of Publicar ltda., a company based on
international projection and innovation which consolida-
ted its expansion, generating the need to acquire more
sophisticated machinery later used in the Carvajal group
publishing business. Before his death, Manuel Carvajal Si-
nisterra decided in 1969, already at an advanced age, to
study business at the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnolo-
gy (MIT). However, he died in Boston in 1971 from a heart
attack.
After the death of Manuel Carvajal Sinisterra, Carvajal's
CEO, the top management position was held by his bro-
ther Jaime, who managed the company from 1971 to
1979. Jaime was the first heir-president of Carvajal to have
a university education. He was a civil engineer educated
at the Medellin Mining School. Under his presidency Car-
vajal Internacional Inc. began operations in New York,
transforming the company into a multinational enterpri-
se. In addition, In 1976 the company ceased to be a limi-
ted company and became the closed corporation Carvajal.
This was due to a higher number of partners as the num-
ber of founder family members had grown. Since that time,
the president has not only overseen the management of
the company, but he also has involved other individuals
and groups such as the general shareholders' meeting, the
board of directors and the chairman of the board. In 1979
Manuel Carvajal Smisterra handed over the CEO position
to Adolfo Carvajal Ouelquejeu and assumed the post of
chairman of the board of directors. Adolfo Carvajal Quel-
quejeu had a graphic arts degree from the Rochester Ins-
titute of Technology in New York (1954) and subsequently
enrolled in graduate studies in administration and finance
at the Universidad de los Andes. He was with the company
from 1954.
The presidency of Adolfo Carvajal Quelquejeu, between
1979 and 1999, was a period of consolidation for Carvajal.
He led to the first holding company in the country's his-
tory, known as Carvaja/!nversiones (Carvajal Investments)
in 1995, transforming the group of companies owned by
the Carvajals into an economic group. In 1995, a protocol'
A protocol is a guide for making decisions. It is a document or
wntten agreement that brings together family, company and own-
ership interests taking into account legal, economic, business, psy-
chological and emotional components of the family. The elements
in a Family Protocol must be: the family, signatories, generations
and possible ramifications. the company's history and its traditional
and business values, principal governance organs and their ccnfiq-
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to manage family relations was created, an issue which
will be covered below Adolfo Carvajal handed the CEO
position to Alberto Jose Carvajal and was later appointed
Colombian ambassador to France. Alberto Carvajal was
president from 1999 to 2001. He has a degree in graphic
arts engineering from Carnegie Mellon University, which
he obtained in 1947. In addition, he is a 1967 graduate of
the masters in industrial administration program at Uni
versidad del Valle. Since 2001, Alfredo Carvajal Sinisterra,
a 1968 graduate of the masters In industrial engineering
program at the Universidad del Valle has been president of
Carvajal. He did his undergraduate studies in Economics at
the Wharton School of Business. Table 1 shows the succes-
sion processes at Carvajal.
TABLE 1. Succession processes at Carvajal
A list of the members of the Carvajal family, the founder as well as heirs, who have
occupied the company management position. is below. It also shows the period
in which they held the position, the generation of the !amily to which they belong
(when possible to determine) and the number of the succession through which they
received the power 10 direct the company. As mentioned in footnote 2, in 2008 Car-










Manuel Carvajal Valencia 1904-1912
Hernando Carvajal Borrero 1912-1939 2 2
Manuel Carvajal Sinisterra 1939-1971 3 3
Jaime Carvajal Sinisterra 1971-1979 3 4
Adolfo Carvajal Quelquejeu 1979-1999 3 5
Alberto Jose Carvajal Lourido 1999-2001 3 6
Alfredo Carvajal Sinisterra 2001-2008 3 7
Ricardo Obregon Trujillo 200B-To-
day
Source: Prepared by the authors using information flOmVan~ga512003)_
uration. A family protocol also includes basic standards for incor-
poration of a family business, compensation policies, dividends,
participation and ownership. Also, succession policy, separation, di-
vorce, usufruct, business and company performance, social respon-
sibility among public objectives and potentials, correlation between
commercial image and family image and potentially risky operations
are also considered in the document. The protocol covers critical sue-
cession processes,family business incorporation, compensation and
ownership policies, methods of resolving conflict that ensure fam-
ily harmony, the company's responsibilities to family members and
contingency plans, among others. Source: Family Business Institute
(200B)
REV. INNOVAR VOl. 20, NUM. 36, ENERO-ABRIL DE 2010
INNOVAR
~ ~" h.
The importance of private knowledge in
management by heirs
Perez-Gonzalez (2006) shows that, on average, family bu-
sinesses that appoint to top management positions heirs
who have not received formal education in "selective" hig-
her education institutions are characterized by poor fi-
nancial performance'. However, these predictions are not
corroborated in the Carvajal case, a company that frorn
1912 to 1971 was under the managernent of heirs, none of
whom had the possibility of studying at university. DUring
this period, Carvajal managed to extend its activities to
cover the whole country, while also making incursions into
international markets. On the other hand, Perez-Gonzalez
states that on average heirs in management positions are
younger than outside managers which he considers as evi-
dence that family firms choose their managers based on
family ties and not on merit. A young managing heir is not
necessarily detrimental to a family business. It is enough
to recall that Manuel Carvajal Sinisterra took over the pre-
sidency of Carvajal at age 23 after having worked seve-
ral years in the company and under his management the
cornpany experienced growth, diversification and develop-
ment. What could make the difference in terms of training
for a managing heir to achieve excellent job performan-
ce? According to the model we developed above, private
knowledge acquired by the heir inside the family business
is crucial in developing his abilities as manager.
With regards to concept of knowledge we should point out
that, "tacit knowledge", or "private knowledge" as referred
to in the model, is when "we can know more than we can
say" (Polanyi, 1966, p. 4). This "knowledge" involves perso-
nal involvement, experience, practice and imitation and is
related to the idea of "learning by doing". This implies that
tacit knowledge often emerges from specific ways of doing
in specific contexts.
Tacit knowledge is crucial to the company's innovation ca-
pacity, its competitive advantages, and ultimately, its fi-
nancial perforrnance. The resource- based view of the firm
(Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984) holds that the organiza-
tion, understood as a unique set of resources, can be the
source of sustainable competitive advantages and can ge-
nerate economic value, as long as it has resources that are
valuable, rare, hard to imitate and without strategic equal
(Barney, 1991). This leads to the perspective of a company
According to Perez-Gonzalez (2006) a "selective" university in the
United States is an institution classified as "very competitive," ac-
cording to the profiles defined by Barron {1980). In 1980, a to-
tal of 189 universities that considered the top 50% of students in
their graduation classes as qualified for admission, were classified
as very competitive.
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built on knowledge; that is, the Idea that knowledge is the
crucial component in sustaining competitive advantage
through Innovation and other value-generating activities
(Grant, 1996).
This knowledge, which supports the company's capacity
for innovation and its competitive advantages, ISwhat an
heir acquires by working inside the company prior to assu-
ming a top management position. This is the main advan-
tage heirs have over an outsider when we compare their
productivity in a family business. In the model presented
above, the productivity of the heir (H) may equal that of
the founder (F), but ISalways superior to that of the outsi-
de manager (A), ",-0 2: "HO > ,,)-); this productivity de-
pends on private knowledge (k,tl related to the company's
operations and other variables oJk", s//, 1'", e'l,).
Bertrand and Schoar (2006) are perhaps among the few
authors who have recognized private knowledge as a
determinant favoring selection of heirs as company ma-
nagers. For them, this could occur when knowledge trans-
mission is easier between the founder and his heirs than
between the founder and an outsider. Mazzola et al.
(200S) address the issue of training next-generation family
members once they have Joined the management team in
their family firm. Their findings indicate that this involve-
ment provides the next generation with crucial tacit busi-
ness knowledge and skills, facilitating interpersonal work
relationships between incumbents and next-generation
leaders and building credibility and legitimacy for the next
generation. Moreover, observations in the case of Carvajal
contradict the arguments of Morek, Stangeland and Yeung
(2000), Perez-Gonzalez (2006), and Burkart, Panaunzi and
Shleifer (2003), which maintain that family management
is generally less efficient than "professional management".
Likewise, they contradict the results of Volpin (2002). who
found that when controlling shareholders are involved in
the company's management, corporate governance and fi-
nancial performance tend to be poor. Finally, the success
of heirs in Carvajal and their longevity in the company's
management coincides with the findings of Smith and
Amoako-Adu (1999), who show good financial performan-
ce when succession processes favor heirs rather than out-
side managers.
In the Carvajal case, all heirs that became CEOs have been
involved with company operations for several years befo-
re assuming top management positions. The two first ma-
naging heirs, Hernando Carvajal Borrero (CEO 1912-1939)
and Manuel Carvajal Sinisterra (CEO 1939-1971) were trai-
ned in the company from a very young age, despite lacking
university education. The innovative tradition of Carvajal
could have become critical "private knowledge". As sum-
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marized, in 1911 the company Imported the first paper
shredding machine, in 1921 the first lithographic printing
press, and it has continued to import the latest technology
to the present day. In addition, in 1939 the company de-
veloped its first mechanical department for construction
of spare parts. Due to the specificity of the assets used,
the knowledge acquired by heirs in their early involvement
Carvajal's business operations, is of great importance for
their later success in management.
The Danaranjo case, also mentioned above, is a good coun-
terexample to what occurred in the case of Carvajal. David
Naranjo had six sons, of which the three eldest predecea-
sed the founder. The three remaining sons had practically
no participation in the company's activities until 1993, the
year that David Naranjo died. Their lack of specific bUSI-
ness experience was one of the factors that led the com-
pany to seek bankruptcy protection in 1999
Intangible, non-monetary benefit
The term "amenity potential" was first proposed by Dem-
setz and Lehn (1985). These authors argue for the existen-
ce of a non-pecuniary gain brought about by the company
name. Obtaining the amenity potential contributes to
maximizing ownership benefits, even if it does not deli-
ver profit maximization to all shareholders. As we mentio-
ned earlier, Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) state that
a founder could obtain non-monetary benefits from ha-
ving a son directing the company that bears the family
name. Alternatively, in some industries, such as sports or
communications, families can participate in or influence
social, political, and cultural events through ownership of
the films. Ehrhardt and Nowak (2001) conclude that if the
intangible, non-monetary benefit is representative, fami-
lies will attempt to retain control of their firms as far as
possible.
The intangible, non-monetary benefit is easily identifiable
when analyzing the Carvajal case. The company came into
being because of the political interests of Manuel Carva-
jal Valencia, probably ahead of his business interests. As
mentioned, in lS94 Manuel Carvajal clubbed together
with some friends to purchase an old printing press and
publish the La Opinion weekly newspaper, to promote the
ideas and candidates of their political party. Subsequently,
in 1904 the Carvajals began to publish the EI Dia news-
paper. Through these media the family waged campaigns
for the creation of the Department of Valle del Cauca and
the Diocese of Cali, objectives that they achieved in 1910.
Manuel Carvajal took up a seat in the newly created De-
partmental Assembly, and later became the department's
Director of Public Instruction, while Hernando Carvajal
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Borrero's (1896-1972) brother was ambassador to Ecuador,
rector of the Universidad del Valle for three years and Mi-
nister of Education. Manuel Antonio Carvajal was arnbas-
sador to Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay, as well as
Governor of Valle del Cauca.
Manuel Carvajal Sinisterra, third president of Carvajal, was
Minister of Mines and Petroleum, a period that saw the
creation of Empresa de Petr61eos de Colombia -Ecopetrol
(1951). Subsequently, he was Minister of Cornmun.cations.
He founded or participated in the creation of entitles such
as the Federation for Higher Education and Development-
Fedesarrollo-, the Foundation for Higher Education -FES-
and the Industrial Association -ANDI-, among others. He
was awarded the Cruz de Boyaca, Medalla 01 Merito Indus-
trial de 10 Notion (National Medal of Industrial Merit) and
an honorary doctorate in social sciences and economics
from the Universidad del Valle.
The social recognition that family members have enjoyed
represents a high intangible, non-monetary benefit that
the Carvajals have enjoyed since inception. The model pre-
sented In this article assumes that this benefit constitutes
another of the advantages for the company to be led by
heirs rather than by outside management. The productivity
of the heir (H), denoted as o.Jkl/' 5". 1'", ell')' which de-
pends on the intangible, non-monetary benefit (1'1)' makes
it for the firm possible to achieve better financial perfor-
mance when it is managed by a family member, as long as
the intangible, non-monetary benefits are representative.
Another reason to preserve family control is reputation.
The benefits of good reputation could be lost if company
management is ceded to an outsider (Burkart et al., 2003),
for example, the economic reputation obtained from the
positioning of the company's products in terms of quali-
ty. Faccio (2002) carried out a study in 42 countries and
found that companies that have political connections are
relatively numerous and that these connection impact po-
sitively on financial performance. Faccro considered a firm
as politically-connected if a controlling shareholder or di-
rector is a member of parliament, minister, chief of state or
closely related to a high-level politician.
It's important to acknowledge that Carvajal's political con-
nections could have had a relevant effect in the success
of the company. This family has always been involved in
the most important Colombian political circles and that
could bring out some benefits for them. We highlighted
previously that many others factors could contribute to the
Carvajal "success" (e.g. political connections and rent see-
king behavior)
Up to now It is apparent how variables of private knowled-
ge and intangible, non-monetary benefits could cause the
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productivity of the managing heir to be superior to that of
an outside manager However, it is pertinent to ask if the
family's growth and the increase in the number of genera-
tions and herrs influence the high productivity enjoyed by
heirs. This discussion is pertinent to the extent that some
authors have argued the incidence of these factors in the
productivity of managers related to the founder's family.
We address this issue next
Learned management abilities
The family's evolution involves a change in the heirs' le-
vel of education. In the first two successions. managers
do not have university education. In the case of Carvajal,
it is clear how over time the managing heir resembles the
outside manager. The frustration experienced by the first
managing heirs from not completing their university stu-
dies was not an issue for the four most recent generations
of the dynasty. Jaime Carvajal (CEO 1971-1979) did his un-
dergraduate studies in the country, while Adolfo Carvajal
Quelquejeu (CEO 1979-1999), Alberto Jose Carvajal (CEO
1999-2001), and Alfredo Carvajal Sinisterra (CEO 2001-
2008) earned their undergraduate degrees abroad and
undertook their graduate studies in Colombia, attending
highly prestigious educational Institutions.
In the model developed above, it is assumed that the
heirs have learned management abilities (5) at least equal
to those potential outside managers. This assumption is
based on the Carvajal case: In the first generations, heirs
had no opportunity to acquire management abilities in
a formal way. Nevertheless, their work experience inside
the company and specific knowledge about the handling
of highly specialized imported machinery are examples
of learned management abilities that are of great practi-
cal importance and it is the result of on-the-job training.
These on-the-Job skills compare favorably with the for-
mal education of the outside manager. Over time, lear-
ned management abilities acquired through working at
the company lose value to the extent that the organi-
zation grows, processes standardize and their complexity
does not permit appropriation of a deep, differentiating
knowledge about each of the many company's activities.
However, more recent heirs' formal training is compara-
ble to that obtained by the outside manager. Both are
un iversity-trai ned.
Increase in the number of generations and heirs
When Manuel Carvajal Valencia founded his company he
had a family consisting of his Wife and SIX sons. Under Jai-
me Carvajal Sinisterra's management (CEO 1971-1979),
the company changed from a limited company to a corpo-
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ration, due to the growing number of heirs as shareholders.
On the other hand, under Adolfo Carvajal Ouelquejeu's
management (CEO 1979-1999) a protocol was developed
to manage family relations. This protocol, created in 1995,
established norms for resolving family conflicts and clearly
managing the relationship between companies and their
herr partners. Among other things, it also established pro-
cedures for selling shares, services that the company could
provide to heirs, prohibited the Carvajals from competing
with family businesses and created the family commit-
tee in charge of monitorrng compliance with these norms,
counseling the family and ensuring the heirs' well-being
The Family Council has a board of directors made up of
all the Carvajals over eighteen years of age. This council
is the entity through which members of the family are
presented If they wish to join the organization, and com-
pete for jobs among themselves and with outsiders. In
addition, It provides support to family members who have
problems. The protocol was circulated in writing, expec-
ting all the heirs would sign it. Given the growth in the
number of family members, it is valid to question how this
affects the managing heir, compared with an outsider In
the same position.
The choice of a managing heir is justified to reduce agency
problems when an outside manager is appointed and see-
ks to extract private benefits (Bertrand and Schaar, 2006;
Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003). Private benefits
from managing the company, as described by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) generate expenses from the profits of out-
side shareholders. Therefore, to hand over control of the
company to outside management exposes the family to
possible expropriation of a portion of its wealth. This su-
ggests that heirs are in a better position to watch over
family interests and focus on maximizing the company's
value without the risk of appropriation of private monetary
benefits. However, a very different situation confronts the
managing heir belonging to the second generation, who
must answer to his father and brothers for the company's
results. He must also answer for the company's manage-
ment to more than 200 heirs who are partners. This si-
tuation could cause the same agency problem as that
confronting an outside manager.
The dilution of benefits with respect to the agency pro-
blem and the similarity of heirs to outsiders could be why
Carvajal has designed selection mechanisms guaranteeing
competency for Job positions between themselves and out-
side candidates. It appears that with the increase in the
number of generations and heirs, their performance in ma-
nagement is far from that achieved by the founding ma-
nager and similar to that obtained by outside managers.
it is possible that the growth of the companies, the for-
malization of duties, standardization of processes and the
competence and symmetry of information among family
members affect benefits in terms of private knowledge
and intangible, non-monetary benefits, and increase the
threat of expropriation of private monetary benefit.
FIGURE 1. Relationship between productivity of founding manager, heir and outsider.
MEMBERS OF THE FOUNDING FAMILY









Source Prepared by the authors
GENERATIONS OF THE FOUNDING FAMILY
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The relationship between the founding manager, the ma-
naging heir and the outside manager over time and the
increase in the number of generations and members of the
family is shown in Figure 1. When this occurs, the heir's
performance as management is far from being as effective
as that of the founding manager, but close to that of out-
side managers. It is possible that the growth of companies,
formalization of duties and standardization of processes,
as well as the reliability and symmetry of information sha-
red by members of the family, affect benefits in terms of
private knowledge and intangible, non-monetary benefits,
and increase the threat of expropriation of private mone-
tary benefits.
The preceding statement could find support in Miller et
al. (2007). These authors state that depending on the
definition used for family business, various empirical re-
sults can be found regarding these firms' financial per-
formance. For some authors a family business is any
company controlled and directed by multiple members of
a founding family (Shanker and Astrachan, 1996), while
for others it is when the company is directed and owned
by a founder without participation by other family mem-
bers. (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Faccio and Lang, 2002;
Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999). According to Miller et al.
(2007), the average performance of family firms is better
when it 15 owned by multiple family members; that group
of firms shows returns similar to those of non-family firms
with similar characteristics.
EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS
Before stating some of the empirical prediction of our
analysis, we present several international examples that
stress our main point in this paper. We posit that an heir
could become as good a manager as the founder if he or
she could gain private knowledge about business affairs
not easily learned outside the firm. Also, the non-financial
benefits he or she may gain when running the family firm
give them a higher utility level when compared to outside
managers (see section 2).
These theoretical arguments which help us to better un-
derstand the Carvajal case, may also be recognized in
other family firms around the world. Bulgari, a well-known
producer of luxury goods with more than 236 stores world-
Wide, is a good example (Bulgari, 2009). It was founded in
1884 in Rome by Sotirio Bulgari, and his two sons, Cons-
tantino and Giorgio Bulgari developed a great interest and
involvement in the family business. They were responsible
for taking Bulgari to the international market (New York,
Paris, Geneva and Monte Carlo). In 1984 the third within-
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family succession took place, bringing with it a period of
great growth and diversification. In 1995 Bulgari was lis-
ted on the Italian Stock Exchange.
There are many other examples of successful within-family
successrons. Conzalo Comella, founded in 1870, is among
the most well-known clothing stores in Barcelona, Spain
(Gonzalo Comella, 2009). The firm is currently run by the
fourth generation with three brothers in top management
positions. The fifth generation is currently working in mid-
level management, getting experience to run the firm In
the future.
Three more examples will help to make our POint: E&C
Callo Winery, a wine producer, Faber-Castell Company, a
writing instruments maker, and Kruss Optronic, precision
optical instruments manufacturer. The first of these three
firms was founded in 1933 by two brothers Ernest and Ju-
lio Gallo, and four generations have passed through the
company management making E&C Gallo Winery the bi-
ggest wine producer in u.s. exporting to more than 90
countries around the world (E&G Gallo Winery, 2009).
Faber-Castell Company was founded in 1761 and today
IS run by the eighth generation. Lothar Faber (fourth ge-
neration) was responsible for the international growth of
the company when he took over at the age of 22, but ha-
ving previously gained experience in Paris and London in
the writing instrument business (Faber-Castell Company,
2009). Finally, Kruss Optronic, also run by the eighth gene-
ration, has always been at the cutting edge of optometric
innovation since ItS inception, with family members acti-
vely involved in the German scientific community and rela-
ted business associations
All these examples represent anecdotic evidence that su-
pport some of the main points we hoped to highlight in our
model and in the Carvajal case: family reputation and spe-
cific knowledge from within the firm in specialized indus-
tries are among the key drivers for successful succession
in family business. Therefore this analysis should not be
interpreted as a "proof" of the model, but as a conceptual
validation of our ideas.
As we said, the Carvajal case analyzed here and these
examples allow us to give conceptual support for our mo-
del; however, the theory we developed could also be vali-
dated empirically in order to gain also statistical support:
Specifically, the model proposes the following concrete
empirical hypotheses:
1. Firms in specialized industries, in which private knowled-
ge is determinant for business success, will have better
financial performance If managed by family members.
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2. Firms managed by heirs who did not work in the family
business prior to becoming CEO, will show inferior fi-
nancial performance.
3 Family businesses which are politically-connected, will
favor heirs for top management positions.
CONCLUSION
All the successful successions in Carvajal run contrary to
literature's theoretical and empirical evidence. Descen-
dants in the Carvajal family with leading responsibilities
did not frustrate the company's economic growth and did
not destroy their ancestors' wealth. On the contrary, they
consolidated the firm over time, expanding it into a group
with considerable relevance to the Colombian economy.
This case presents arguments in favor of the idea that the
benefits of a founder-CEO, under certain conditions, could
be extended to an heir-CEO. These include the presence of
private knowledge crucial to company success and an in-
tangible, non-monetary benefit for the family. Ultimately,
it can be expected that like a founding CEO, a managing
heir can make use of specific knowledge about the firm
that is difficult for outsiders to obtain, thus generating
high levels of confidence with key interest groups within
and outside the firm. In addition, heirs can benefit families
to the extent that there is an intangible, non-monetary be-
nefit from directing and perpetuating positions of power in
the firm, which can protect the family's interest in a weak
investor protection environment. It also lowers the risk of
appropriation of cash flows by an outside manager.
On the other hand, it is possible that the heir, like the
founding manager, will employ a long-term strategy, thus
avoiding "management myopia" (Stein, 1988; 1989). Ac-
cording to this author, managers avoid assuming long-term
projects that could have low short-term returns, for fear
that the market will incorrectly interpret this financial per-
formance and he will lose his job, or face hostile takeover
threats. Family management is less worried about the mar-
ket reactions of business decisions. Zellweger (2007) states
that family firms display longer-term horizons than most of
their non family counterparts since family firms hold longer
CEO tenure and this firm will strive for long-term indepen-
dence and succession within the family.
Finally, growth in the number of generations and heirs of
the founder's family affect the managing heir's performan-
ce, mitigating the advantages with respect to the agen-
cy problem in relation to appointing the manager. On the
other hand, a greater number of heirs imply competency
due to access to jobs, a greater level of meritocracy and
preparation of heirs which is similar to that of outsiders in
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terms of formal education. Therefore, under these situa-
tions the heir'S performance is a long way from being as
effective as the founder's performance, but close to that of
an outside manager.
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oU F = ~[Wr + e{a,.OB{1 r)- pI r - wF}+ h{r,)- g{e)]oe oe
p{:rOXoa,O/oe)S + e{{oaFO/oe)S -/{:rOXoa,O/oe)B} = g'{e)
p{:rOXoaA·)/oe)B + e{{oaFO/oe)B - /{:rOXoa,O/oe )B} = g'(e)
((oarO/oe)BX/'{:rO)+e{l-p{:rO)})= g'(e) (7)
Proof of Proposition I
From equation (8) It holds that ((oaFO/oe)S)Y = g'(e). and additionally, from equation (5) it is known that for all
optimal effort oaA·)I. > oa,J)I'
oee·oe,
Departing from this, it is possible to establish two equations where the founder and the outside manager equalize their
marginal cost and their marginal income from effort:
((oaFO/oe~)S)Y =g'(e;.) (8.1)
((oa,J)/oe:)S)Y =g'(e~) (8.2)
Subtracting equation 8.2 from equation 8.1, it holds that
(
aarO aa,J))BY _ ,(.)_ ,(.)
a • ~ • - g e, g eA (83)eF oe;!
Becauseof (5) that the left part of equation (8.3) is greater than zero.Therefore,
g'(e~)-g'(e:»O ==> g'(e;·»g'(d
and knowing that and, then
e;- > e; •
Deduction of equation (/4)
O~I = :)W'I + e{a,J)B(tF + 111)- p(t,. +1,/)- wII}+ hhJ- g(e)]
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oU" = ~[j(lZ{))+ B{a" OB(Ir + IN )- p(Jr + IN)- /(;r())}+ h(rN )- g(e)]oe oe
/'(JrOXOaH ()joe)B+B{(oaNO/oe )8- /,(JrOXoa" 0/oe)8) = g'(e)
((oa,J)/oe)8 X/'(JrO)+ B{l- /'(Jrom = g'(e)
((oaHO/oe)BX/,(JrOXI-B)+B) = g'(e) (14)
Proof of Proposition 2
From equation (15), it holds that ((aa" (·);ae)S)V ~ g'(e), and in addition, from equation (12) it is known that for all op-
timal effort
oarOj ;:.oaHOI > oa,,(.)j.
Be l'. 8e e* Be e*
Starting from this, it is possible establish two equations where the heir and the outside manager equalize their marginal
cost and their marginal income from effort:
((oaJ)/oe~)8 ~ = g'(e~)
((oa J)/oe:)S)Y = g'(e:)
(15.1)
(15.2)
Subtracting equation 15.2 from 15.1 it holds that
(O;H,O o~A,OIBY = g'(e;,)- g'(e:) (15.3)eN ueA)
From (12), it is known that the left part of equation (15.3) is greater than zero. Finally
g'(e;;}- g' (e:» °~~> g' (e;,» g'(e:)
and knowing that g'(e);:' ° and g"(e» 0, then
e;,>e~ •
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